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Ruth Percival, a 28 year-old woman, gave birth to her son on the toilet in her home in 
November 2014. The child was born with the umbilical cord wrapped around his neck and 
was reported by Ruth’s father to have ‘appeared "sallow and lifeless" and he thought was 
"obviously deceased"’ (The Telegraph, 2017). Ruth and her father were initially arrested on 
suspicion of murder and conspiracy to conceal the birth of a child. Over two-years later, both 
charges were dropped, and Ruth and her father were arrested on suspicion of child neglect; 
later this charge would also be dropped. Despite a prolonged investigation and several post-
mortems, the cause of death of the baby boy remained ‘unascertained’. A coroner’s inquest, 
conducted almost two-years after the death of the child, was halted when the coroner decided 
to adjourn the inquest and refer the case to the Director of Public Prosecutions; consequently, 
Ruth and her father faced a third criminal investigation over the death of the baby. The 
referral came after three medical professionals presented evidence at the inquest that the baby 
had been born alive, suggesting that he could have survived if the correct medical attention 
had been given. Dr Ruth Gottstein, a consultant neonatologist, told the court ‘If resuscitation 
had been initiated, I think the baby would survived’ (Parveen, 2016). Further suspicion was 
aroused following evidence that Ruth had placed the baby in the outside bin (Ruth and her 
father denied this); that paramedics had not been called immediately following the birth; and 
that the child’s body was left alone in the house while Ruth and her father attended a 
previously arranged doctor’s appointment after cleaning the blood from the bathroom floor. 
The investigations into the birth and death of Ruth’s child ended after 28 months, when the 
Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) decided that there was ‘insufficient evidence to provide a 
realistic prospect of conviction for a criminal prosecution’ (The Telegraph, 2017).  
This case illustrates some of the typical features of the phenomenon of ‘neonaticide’, 
newborn child killing: a single woman experiencing an unwanted pregnancy and giving birth 
alone, resulting in the death of her baby. Such cases are unusual in Western modern society 
and are emotionally distressing for the public and professionals. The Percival case also 
highlights a number of issues with regard to criminalising women whose babies die at birth. 
First, it highlights the efforts of the police and CPS to investigate this particular case with the 
aim of initiating prosecution, despite the limited evidence available to them. Second, it 
demonstrates that there are limits to the reach of the criminal law in cases involving the 
deaths of neonates following ‘secret’ births. Finally, the case raises questions about the 
purpose and appropriateness of criminalisation in cases of maternal neonaticide. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine these issues and to this end we do the 
following: first, we provide an outline of the literature on the circumstances and incidence of 
neonaticide; second, we discuss some of the problems that arise in connection with 
convicting women of criminal offences, particularly homicide crimes, when their babies die 
following a ‘secret birth’; third, we briefly outline what we know about criminal justice 
practice in these cases, and,  finally, we offer some reflections for future research and 
practice.  
What is neonaticide? 
The term ‘neonaticide’ was first used by Resnick (1969, 1970) to describe the killing of an 
infant within the first twenty-four hours of life. Resnick, and others, argue that it is a distinct 
form of child homicide. It is usually committed by the mother in the context of an unwanted 
pregnancy (d'Orbán, 1979; Friedman and Friedman, 2010; Meyer and Oberman, 2001; Porter 
and Gavin, 2010). The term neonaticide is widely used within medical, legal, psychiatric, 
psychological and criminological literature and many attempts have been made to understand 
its causes and consider prevention. 
It is difficult to determine the rate of neonaticide. Scholars have commented on the 
inaccuracy of official statistics; Wilczynski (1997) argues there is a large ‘dark figure’ of 
child killing (victim aged under 16 years), estimating that true incidents of child homicide are 
3 to 7 times higher than official statistics report. In the UK, no official record of how many 
children are killed within the first day of life are kept. The Home Office record the number of 
homicides that occur each year in the Homicide Index. However, as we discuss below, 
proving a homicide has occurred can be very difficult in cases of neonaticide. In some cases, 
the death of a foetus/newborn child may be recorded under the criminal offence of 
concealment of birth (COB). Section 60 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 
(OAPA), makes it is an offence to conceal the dead body of a baby in order to conceal the 
fact the infant had been born; it is irrelevant for the purposes of conviction how and when 
death was caused. Therefore, cases of suspected COB may also be cases of neonaticide. Due 
to the close connection between COB and newborn homicide (Milne, Forthcoming), it is 
possible that some deaths will be recorded in both the Homicide Index and the police 
recorded statistics for concealment, producing a duplicate count. Despite the shortcomings, 
the data presented in Table 1 offers the most comprehensive picture of known neonaticide 
cases and taken together, the average is 7 deaths per year. Drawing upon Wilczynski’s (1997) 
conclusion that actual figures are, at least, three times higher than official statistics, then the 
possible number of neonaticides to occur each year is 21.1 
Year Offences currently recorded 
as homicide, victims one day 
old or less2 
Police recorded crime: 
Concealing an infant 
death close to birth3 
Total 
2002/03 3 7 10 
2003/04 2 6 8 
2004/05 0 6 6 
2005/06 0 8 8 
2006/07 3 4 7 
2007/08 1 8 9 
2008/09 5 8 13 
2009/10 0 6 6 
2010/11 1 9 10 
2011/12 1 5 6 
2012/13 1 2 3 
2013/14 2 2 4 
2014/15 1 5 5 
2015/16 2 5 5 
Annual 
mean 
2 6 7 
Table 1 Estimated number occurrence of neonaticide 2002/03 to 2015/16 
Neonaticide is almost exclusively committed by women. Much of the literature 
constructs a stereotype of the neonaticidal woman: she is young, often a teenager, single, 
lives with her parents, comes from a low socioeconomic background, and has few economic, 
social or emotional resources to deal with a pregnancy (See Alder and Baker, 1997; Craig, 
2004; d'Orbán, 1979; Resnick, 1969; Porter and Gavin, 2010). Such women have also been 
described as ‘passive’, not taking active steps to address their pregnancy (Spinelli, 2003; 
Beyer et al., 2008; Amon et al., 2012). However, not all women fit the stereotype. For 
example, perpetrators older than teenagers have been identified in numerous studies. A 
review of coroner’s reports and death certificates in Finland and Austria conducted by Amon 
et al. (2012) concluded that perpetrators’ average age was 28. There is also dispute in the 
literature about perpetrators’ socioeconomic background. For example, Beyer et al. (2008), in 
their review of law enforcement case files in the US, concluded that the majority of the 
offenders were middle-class, with only 5 out of 37 women identified as working-class. 
Similarly, a review of cases in the US using newspaper reports, conducted by Meyer and 
Oberman (2001), found suspected women came from diverse socioeconomic backgrounds 
and across ethnic groups. Many studies reported that perpetrators are not always single, 
childless or living with their parents. Amon et al. (2012) noted that 16 of 28 perpetrators were 
married or living with a partner and all sixteen reported having sexual relationships during 
the pregnancy. Beyer et al. (2008) found that 15 of 40 perpetrators had experienced previous 
pregnancies. 
One similarity between cases of neonaticide is that women keep their pregnancy 
secret from the wider world and specifically from the individuals around them whose 
response to their pregnancy they fear, such as parents, other relatives and partners. In this 
regard, neonaticide often follows a concealed or denied pregnancy, a fact which creates 
difficulties for detection and any subsequent prosecution. Debate exists within the literature 
as to the extent to which a woman can be unaware that she is pregnant. For example, several 
scholars argue that women must have some awareness of her pregnancy, but then deny 
knowledge of its existence to herself and others (Spinelli, 2003; Brezinka et al., 1994; Miller, 
2003). Others have argued that there is a distinction between a woman who knows she is 
pregnant and thus conceals her pregnancy from others, and those who have only an 
unconscious awareness of their pregnancy and so are in denial about its existence (Wessel et 
al., 2002; Vellut et al., 2012). Other scholars have also documented the co-occurrence of 
denial and concealment, arguing women can experience both at different times during their 
pregnancy (Amon et al., 2012; Meyer and Oberman, 2001; Brezinka et al., 1994). From the 
literature, it is difficult to conclude the extent to which a woman may be aware of her 
pregnancy prior to the onset of labour and subsequent delivery.  
The connection between concealed/denied birth and neonaticide has led a number of 
scholars to conclude that concealed or denied pregnancy is a risk factor for neonaticide (Beier 
et al., 2006; Beyer et al., 2008; Craig, 2004; Friedman and Friedman, 2010; Porter and Gavin, 
2010). However, as Spinelli (2010) argues, neonaticide is not the usual outcome for a 
concealed/denied pregnancy. Data pertaining to the number of concealed/denied pregnancies 
each year would support this conclusion. While we have no accurate figures of the number of 
concealed/denied pregnancies each year, researchers have estimated that they occur from one 
in every 2,455 births (study from Germany, Wessel et al., 2002) to 1 in 1,000 (study in 
France, Pierronne et al., 2002; cited in Gonçalves et al., 2014). Using a study from Wales that 
concludes concealed pregnancies occur one in 2,500 deliveries (Nirmal et al., 2006), we can 
estimate that approximately 280 concealed/denied pregnancies occurred in England and 
Wales in 2015, based on 700,999 babies being delivered, live- and stillborn (Office for 
National Statistics, 2016). As outlined earlier in the chapter, we do not know the exact 
instances of neonaticide that occur, although approximately seven cases are recorded each 
year. Regardless of our lack of certainty in these figures, it is very unlikely that the rate of 
neonaticide is close to 280. Consequently, it is reasonable to conclude that while neonaticide 
often occurs after a concealed/denied pregnancy, a concealed/denied pregnancy is not always 
a predictor of risk. 
Criminalising ‘neonaticide’ 
Whilst the literature may term deaths of babies in the period immediately surrounding birth 
as ‘neonaticides’, the criminal law’s approach is somewhat different. To start with, there is no 
specific crime of ‘neonaticide’. A range of offences which include standard homicide 
offences (murder and manslaughter) and specific statutory crimes tailored to the fact that 
death occurred in the context of pregnancy and childbirth (such as infanticide, child 
destruction, COB), may be used to criminalise women whose infants die around birth. 
Second, the fact that a baby died at or around the time of birth, even if this was ostensibly due 
to (morally) blameworthy conduct on the part of the mother, such as an act of violence or 
neglect to ensure for safe delivery of the baby, does not necessarily mean that she is guilty of 
any crime. Whether a crime has been committed will depend on whether the legal 
requirements for a specific offence have been met on the evidence available. The 
criminalisation of women for the deaths of their babies at birth gives rise to myriad 
complexities. Many of the difficulties stem from the law’s distinction between the foetus and 
a legal person, and the different levels of protection offered to each. Some of the issues that 
arise in connection with criminalising women for the deaths of their babies at birth will now 
be briefly explored. 
The Born Alive Rule 
In everyday language the terms ‘child’, ‘baby’, ‘infant’ may be aptly used to capture the 
identity and status of those who die around the time of birth.  Legally, however, the situation 
is complicated by the demarcation between the foetus and legal persons that is created by the 
born alive rule. Where neonaticide is suspected the law on homicide requires proof that the 
victim had achieved legal personhood, that they were a ‘reasonable being in rerum natura’ 
(Coke, 1681, pp. 50-1). This means that a conviction for murder, manslaughter, or infanticide 
is only possible if, at the time death occurred, the victim was ‘born alive’. 
To be born alive, the body of the infant must be fully expelled from the birth canal, so 
that no part of the infant remains inside the mother, and there must be an independent 
existence (Davies, 1937, pp. 206-208; Ormerod and Laird, 2015, p. 559). Historically, there 
was a lack of clarity as to what constituted an independent existence, there being ‘no 
authorised definition of live birth in the theory of law’ (Atkinson, 1904, p. 134). Questions 
relating to whether and when the child had breathed, whether the child had an independent 
circulation, and whether the umbilical cord had been cut, were considered important 
(Atkinson, 1904). The current accepted test, stemming from nineteenth-century case law, for 
an independent existence, is evidence of an independent circulation (R. v. Enoch and Pulley). 
The umbilical cord does not need to be severed (R. v. Crutchley; R. v. Reeves; R. v. Trilloe). 
Breathing is a factor to consider, but it is not decisive (R. v. Poulton; R. v. Brain; R. v. Sellis). 
Whilst the test is now clear, proving that an independent circulation was established may still 
give rise to difficulties (Ormerod and Laird, 2015, p. 559).  
Where death occurs before a neonate has achieved legal personhood no homicide 
offence has been committed. In such cases, depending on the factual circumstances involved, 
the prosecution may be able to rely on some other offence which does not require the victim 
to have achieved legal personhood, such as COB, procuring a miscarriage (OAPA, 1861 s58), 
or child destruction (Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929, s.1). However, although each of 
these offences allows for conviction for an offence in the absence of a live birth, they have 
their own unique requirements which may on the evidence preclude successful prosecution.  
The relationship between the born alive rule and the other requirements for 
establishing liability for any of the existing homicide offences might mean that even if a 
neonate dies after it has achieved legal personhood, there may be other reasons, connected 
with the legal distinction between foetuses and legal persons, which preclude a homicide 
conviction. For example, whilst acts done pre-birth which result in the death of the neonate 
after a ‘live birth’ will satisfy the actus reus (conduct) requirement for murder, problems may 
arise in establishing the mens rea (mental fault) for that offence in such circumstances due to 
the legal distinction between the foetus and a ‘human being’ (Temkin, 1986; Simester et al., 
2016, pp. 375-376; Attorney General’s Reference (No. 3 of 1994)). This can give rise to 
complex issues that are beyond the scope of this chapter.  
Criminalising Neglect  
Cases of ‘neonaticide’ discussed in the literature show that the deaths of infants at the time of 
birth are not always due to a positive and deliberate act of violence (Beier et al., 2006). 
Neonates may die for a variety of reasons, including failure to ensure safe delivery by 
seeking medical assistance; failure during an unassisted birth to perform certain tasks to 
ensure the survival of the newborn, such as cutting and tying the umbilical cord; mishandling 
of the neonate during or after birth (for example, accidental strangulation or suffocation when 
trying to expel the baby from the birth canal); leaving the child to die after birth. There are 
two issues that arise in cases where death was not due to a deliberate act of violence but to 
conduct which may be termed ‘neglect’. The first issue relates to restrictions on imposing 
criminal liability for an ‘omission’ rather than a positive ‘act’. The second is connected with 
the level of criminal, as opposed to moral, fault involved, and whether the woman can be held 
liable for a homicide offence where death was due to maternal neglect.  
First, many of the above examples of neglect involve ‘omissions’ rather than ‘acts’. 
Overall, the criminal law is slow to criminalise individuals for their omissions. There are 
some limited circumstances where the law imposes a ‘duty to act’ and where failure to act 
may result in criminal liability being imposed for a crime such as homicide. One of the well-
recognised duties is that which a parent owes to their child (Simester  et al., 2016, pp. 75-76). 
The issue of whether a woman has a duty to act with regard to her unborn child, however, is 
complicated by the born alive rule. Whilst there are no recent authorities explicitly on this 
point, it would seem that the parental duty to act only arises after the child has been born 
alive. The older case law establishes that a decision to give birth alone, and therefore fail to 
prepare for birth, is not sufficient to allow for a homicide conviction; neglect before birth 
does not suffice and there must be evidence of neglect after the child is born (R. v. Knights; 
R. v. Izod).  
In terms of more recent authorities, we must look to the civil law. In the civil, rather 
than criminal, law a woman does not owe her foetus a ‘duty of care’ and therefore cannot be 
sued by her child for harm she causes to it through her negligent behaviour whilst the child 
was a foetus. The only exception involves injury caused as a result of a road traffic accident. 
However, in such instances a child would claim compensation through its mother’s motor 
insurance.4 Women do not lose any rights to determine what they do to their own bodies, 
despite being pregnant. In the medical law context, women who have mental capacity can 
refuse treatment (for example, a caesarean section), even where this carries a risk of death for 
the foetus/child (St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S; Cave, 2004, pp. 62-74). The Court 
of Appeal recently indicated – in a case to do with whether women who cause serious harm 
to their foetus (and child) by drinking excessively during pregnancy can be liable for a 
criminal offence under our existing law, that the approach to the issue of maternal duty of 
care towards the foetus in the above civil contexts would similarly apply in the criminal law 
(Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority v First-tier Tribunal).   
Whilst the concept of a ‘duty of care’ in criminal law is not the same as a ‘duty to act’ 
(Ormerod and Laird, 2015, pp. 638-641), the indication from the above is that women have 
no duty to act to protect their foetus from harm or death and so cannot be liable for homicide 
where death was caused by a pre-‘live birth’ omission. In other words, it seems that a woman 
has no duty to act with regard to her foetus. Consequently, she cannot be liable for homicide 
for an omission made prior to or during birth which led to the death of the baby, even if death 
occurred after a live birth. The issue of criminalising women for the deaths of their newborn 
infants as a consequence of their failure to act appropriately with regard to ensuring the 
survival and health of the foetus/unborn child highlights moral and legal questions which 
point to a tension between maternal autonomy and maternal responsibility. As the law stands, 
it seems that autonomy is given greater primacy, even where this poses a risk to the health or 
life of the foetus/ child born alive.  
Second, the question of liability for homicide in the event of the baby dying as a result 
of neglect after birth is complicated by the requirements for mental fault. To be liable for 
murder it is necessary to show an intention to kill or an intention to cause really serious harm 
(R. v Moloney). Cases involving ‘neglect’ would not meet this threshold, though it should be 
highlighted that a murder conviction can be sustained on the basis of an omission, for 
example a failure to care for the baby (providing this occurred after a live birth), if this was 
done for the purpose of causing death or seriously harming the baby. In the absence of 
violence, however, it will surely be difficult to prove such intent, particularly given the 
woman’s likely physical and mental condition following an unassisted labour. The more 
appropriate offence to charge in cases involving neglect of the baby after birth, where there is 
no evidence of an intention to kill or seriously harm, is gross negligence manslaughter.5 
However, there may also be problems in securing a conviction for that offence because the 
test for ‘gross negligence’ requires the jury to consider whether the accused ‘deserves’ to be 
convicted (R v Adomako, p. 187). This allows for moral rather than legal judgments about the 
seriousness of her conduct in the circumstances involved. As a result, the law lacks certainty 
– what one jury may consider criminal, another may not (Simester et al., 2016, pp. 419-420). 
Certainly, it is feasible that in a case involving the typical neonaticide facts outlined above, a 
jury would conclude that the mother does not deserve conviction for manslaughter.  
Impact of mental state on mental fault requirements 
The literature on neonaticide highlights that women and girls whose neonates die in the 
context of an unassisted birth may experience particular effects on their mental state. For 
example, in some cases, they may lose consciousness as a result of the physical trauma of an 
unassisted birth; in others, they may claim that they didn’t know what they were doing at the 
time, or that they experienced a sense of dissociation. In particular, research has shown that 
women who kill neonates can experience active fear and cognitive denial of pregnancy. 
Meyer and Oberman (2001) argue that this leads women to delay any decision about the 
pregnancy until it is too late; consequently, the birth of the child comes as a shock to the 
woman who kills from fear and panic in this situation. Furthermore, it is known for women 
not to remember the birth and some women with a more profound denial will not recall the 
pregnancy. Spinelli (2003) draws similar conclusions after conducting psychiatric interviews 
with seventeen American women who were accused of killing their newborn children. 
Spinelli categorised the women as having unassisted births associated with dissociative 
psychosis in 10 cases, dissociative hallucinations in 14, and intermittent amnesia delivery in 
14 cases. Each woman described ‘watching’ herself during the birth. Twelve experienced 
dissociative hallucinations ranging from an internal commentary to critical and argumentative 
voices; 14 experienced brief amnesia; nine described associated psychotic symptoms at the 
sight of the infant. When the women awoke from the dissociative hallucination, it was to find 
a dead newborn child whose presence they could not explain.   
The fact that the accused was unconscious, in a dissociative state, or had some other 
mental disorder, may affect her criminal liability in a number of ways. It may, for example, 
give rise to a defence, such as automatism, insanity (M’Naghten’s Case (1843) 10 C and F 
200; 8 ER 718), or, on a murder charge only, the partial defence of diminished responsibility 
(Homicide Act 1957).6  In particular, the offence/defence of infanticide may be used. 
Infanticide operates as an alternative to murder or manslaughter in cases where a woman, by 
a ‘wilful act or omission’ kills her baby (aged under 12 months) whilst the ‘balance of her 
mind was disturbed by reason of her not having fully recovered from the effect of giving 
birth to the child or by reason of the effect of lactation consequent the birth of the child’ 
(Infanticide Act 1938, ss. 1 and 2). Although the statute extends to victims aged under 12 
months, when it was originally enacted in 1922 it was primarily focused on facilitating 
lenient treatment of women who killed their babies at birth due a reluctance to convict her of 
murder and condemn her to death (Davies, 1937, 1938; Brennan, 2013a).  
Although infanticide allows for a more lenient approach, feminists have criticised this 
law on the ground that it medicalises the offender, explaining her crime as the product of a 
biologically produced mental disturbance and failing to acknowledge any social, economic, 
and political causes (Morris and Wilczynski, 1993). However, research into the history of this 
law shows that the mental disturbance rationale was based on a lay understanding of 
infanticide which could take account of the social and other causes of infanticide (Ward, 
1999; Kramar, 2005; Kramar and Watson, 2006; Brennan, 2013b). In terms of how the law 
has been applied in practice, research has shown that it allows for ‘covert recognition’ of 
social causes (Morris and Wilczynski, 1993), and that it operates as a ‘legal device’ to 
facilitate lenient treatment of at least some girls and women who kill their babies at birth 
(Mackay, 1993, p. 29). Other jurisdictions that have adopted the same law have had a similar 
experience (Brennan, forthcoming-b) 
In summary, ‘infanticide’ may be a particularly apt charge or conviction option in 
cases of ‘neonaticide’, and to some extent is tailor-made for these cases. Although the 
requirements for murder or manslaughter must also be proven, it would seem that the specific 
medical rationale of the infanticide law is not difficult to meet, and so those who kill their 
babies at birth may be convicted of infanticide even where there is little evidence of a 
specific mental disorder. An infanticide conviction generally results in exceptionally lenient 
sentences (in the context of homicide); offenders are rarely imprisoned (Walker, 1968). 
However, there may be wider social implications of a prosecution, such as being prevented 
from raising any subsequent children, even if the neonaticide occurred when the woman was 
a teenager and her future pregnancy occurred many years later in very different 
circumstances. 
Criminal Justice Practice in Cases of Neonaticide 
There is very little research available on how cases of ‘neonaticide’ are currently dealt with 
by the criminal authorities in England and Wales. The Ruth Percival case mentioned in the 
introduction indicates that the CPS seriously consider initiating prosecutions in these cases, 
and is willing to explore a range of criminal offence options in this regard. However, before 
prosecuting for a specific offence, there must be ‘sufficient evidence [of the requirements for 
that offence] to provide a realistic prospect of conviction’ (CPS, 2013, para. 4.4). As the 
Percival case highlights, there may be difficulties in cases of suspected neonaticide in 
meeting the requirement for evidential sufficiency. This is supported by the above analysis of 
some of the complexities involved in seeking to establish the requirements for criminal 
offences, particularly for homicide, in typical cases of suspected neonaticide. These cases 
pose unique challenges which may preclude criminalisation of a woman whose baby dies 
following a secret birth due to there being insufficient evidence to support a criminal charge. 
Further, even where there is sufficient evidence to charge with an offence, the CPS is not 
obliged to prosecute because the second part of the test for prosecution must be met, namely 
that prosecution is in the ‘public interest’ (CPS, 2013, para. 4.7-4.12). This gives the CPS 
discretion to not prosecute. A recent case in Preston where a woman was convicted of 
murdering her newborn baby after a concealed birth (Milne, 2017a) indicates, however, that 
successful prosecutions do take place, and, further,  that prosecutors will not necessarily shy 
away from seeking the law’s ultimate sanction, notwithstanding the existence of more lenient 
options, such as infanticide. The Percival and Preston cases are just two recent examples, but 
what we do not have is an overall picture of how the criminal justice system disposes of 
suspected neonaticide.  
Empirical work by Mackay (1993, 2006) which focuses specifically on the use of the 
infanticide law gives an indication of how some suspected neonaticides are dealt with, 
indicating a tendency towards a lenient response. In a 1980s study, he observed that ‘cases 
which may lead to an infanticide or related charge tend to be of the type where prosecutorial 
discretion is likely to the exercised in the female defendant’s favour’ (1993, p. 29): no 
prosecution was taken in 11 of the 21 newborn victim cases in his sample, in most cases 
because it was considered to not be in the public interest to prosecute. A subsequent study of 
infanticide convictions involving 15 newborn victims during the period 1990 to 2003 
evidences a tendency to charge with murder but to dispose of the case as ‘infanticide’ 
(Mackay, 2006). The accused in the newborn sample had all pleaded guilty to infanticide, but 
in nine of these cases the original charge had been murder, with infanticide being later added 
to the indictment.  None of the 15 was given a custodial sentence. The approach taken by the 
CPS in the second study may suggest lenient treatment of women suspected of killing their 
babies at birth. However, the sample only focuses on those convicted of infanticide and so 
provides no indication of how others who were suspected of killing their babies at birth but 
who were not disposed of under the infanticide law were treated. Limited available research 
into the outcome of all cases of neonaticide prevents a firm conclusion from being drawn. 
Furthermore, the discretion available to the CPS when deciding whether to prosecute and 
what kind of charge to bring, means that it is not possible to generalise in these cases. For 
some women leniency appears to drive prosecutorial decisions but this suggestion cannot be 
applied across all cases. 
The neonaticidal woman and the criminal justice system – some reflections 
Our analysis of the legal dynamics of cases of neonaticide leads us to four reflections. The 
first relates to the language that surrounds newborn child killing and specifically the use of 
the term ‘neonaticide’ in both academic literature and wider social use. As illustrated above, 
the term neonaticide is employed within the literature to describe the death of a child/foetus 
in various circumstances, ranging from the child born alive and then violently killed by its 
mother, to the foetus that dies before or during labour, whatever the cause of death. Scholarly 
analyses of neonaticide has included deaths that may not have been acts of homicide, due to 
for example a lack of evidence of the legal requirements for imposing liability (for example, 
live birth). As such, the appropriateness of the term ‘neonaticide’ as a catch-all term to cover 
all cases where the death of the foetus/baby occurs at birth needs to be considered. As a 
general term to describe a typology of killing it can be useful. However, within a legal 
context, ‘neonaticide’, as a concept, does not encapsulate the complexities that surround these 
deaths. We would caution against the application of this term to describe the deaths of 
infants/foetuses. 
Our second reflection relates to the complexities involved in prosecuting cases of 
suspected neonaticide, the issue of consistency in criminal justice practice, and the need for 
further research. As highlighted by the case of Ruth Percival, due to the typical circumstances 
involved in cases of suspected neonaticide, prosecutors may face difficulty in passing the first 
requirement for prosecution– evidential sufficiency – despite the range of offences at their 
disposal. There is also an issue of consistency in approach given the variety of options open 
to prosecutors in terms of the offences they can consider; the fact that they have discretion to 
not prosecute on public interest grounds; and have the option to accept a guilty plea for 
another offence (for example an infanticide plea on a murder charge).  
Whilst we do not seek to challenge prosecutorial discretion per se, we do wish to 
highlight the risk for inconsistency between cases with similar factual backgrounds. In the 
US, for example, Oberman’s (1996) research has shown that cases of suspected neonaticide 
can result in widely disparate criminal outcomes, ranging from first degree murder charges 
(and prison sentences of over 30 years) to charges for misdemeanors with very lenient 
sentencing. Whilst the American and English approaches are not directly comparable, for 
example the latter has a specific infanticide law and a tendency towards more lenient 
outcomes (Maier-Katkin and Ogle, 1997), Oberman’s (1996) research does highlight the risk 
of inconsistency in approach. 
What is needed is further research to consider the application of the law across cases 
to assess a number of issues, including consideration of the following: the charges brought in 
cases involving suspected neonaticides; the outcome of prosecutions; the role and impact of 
guilty pleas; the extent to which the CPS exercises discretion to not prosecute; the extent to 
which all of the foregoing are affected by the factual background, such as whether differences 
in decisions and outcomes can be explained by differences in the evidence and the 
circumstances. In this regard, questions about the role of non-legal factors in the processing 
of these cases should also be addressed. For example, do judgments about suspected 
neonaticide offenders as women and mothers play a role in how they are dealt with by the 
criminal justice system (Morris and Wilczynski, 1993; Allen, 1987; Brennan, forthcoming-a). 
Another interesting issue to consider is the role of social norms in the criminal justice 
response to these cases (Brennan, forthcoming-b). Due to the sensitive nature of this area of 
law and the discretion of the police and CPS, we suggest that such research would need to be 
conducted with the support of criminal justice bodies. 
Our third reflection directly speaks to the aims of this book – the implications of 
criminal justice involvement with women, in this instance with regard to cases of suspected 
neonaticide. Considering the nature of these cases, specifically the vulnerability of the 
offender, we believe it is important to consider whether the involvement of criminal justice in 
such cases is the most appropriate response. There is a significant body of evidence 
supporting the claim that women involved in cases of suspected neonaticide are vulnerable. 
As outlined in this chapter, they are often young and single. Furthermore, research has 
demonstrated that women’s responses to their pregnancies – concealment/denial of the 
pregnancy, solo birth and death of the infant – can be attributed to the fear of the reaction of 
others to her pregnancy (Alder and Baker, 1997; Meyer and Oberman, 2001; Spinelli, 2003). 
For example, Beyer et al. (2008) conclude from their review of law enforcement files in the 
US that women are often motivated by fear, associated with the shame and guilt of being 
pregnant and concern about the reaction of parents, partners and others if the pregnancy is 
discovered. Oberman (2003) advocates that maternal filicide is deeply embedded in and 
responsive to the societies in which it occurs, citing contemporary American policies towards 
single parents. 
Considering the context and the nature of cases of neonaticide, the suitability and 
purpose of criminalising these women needs to be considered. For instance, it can hardly be 
said that convicting women of a homicide offence, or any other crime available to 
prosecutors in this area, will act as a means of preventing similar instances by other women. 
To suggest that the law will act as a deterrent seems to imply that women may become 
pregnant for the purpose of killing the foetus/newborn. Certainly, it ignores the context of 
this crime, in particular the fact that it may follow a denied pregnancy where birth comes as a 
shock and where the woman may act out of fear and desperation; in other words, that her 
mental and emotional state is such that she is incapable of being deterred.  
It is undoubtedly symbolically important for the law to say that the killing of an infant 
who has achieved legal personhood will be treated as seriously as other homicides. To 
suggest otherwise would not only raise moral questions about the sanctity of human life, but 
also human rights concerns about the right to life of infants, for example under article 2 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. It seems morally abhorrent to suggest that those 
who kill the most vulnerable in our society should not be subject to criminal sanction. A full 
examination of the ethical, legal and philosophical questions that arise is beyond the scope of 
this article. At this point the most that can be said is that the vulnerability of women who kill 
their babies at birth suggests that caution is needed regarding whether and when they should 
be criminalised. In this regard, prosecutorial discretion to not prosecute under the public 
interest test may be particularly important in terms of ensuring that vulnerable girls and 
women are not criminalised, but this carries disadvantages, particularly with regard to 
consistency in approach. Minimal criminalisation involving an appropriate lenient conviction 
with a non-custodial sentence, such as can be provided under the infanticide law, may also 
provide a suitable balance between protecting vulnerable girls/women from further trauma 
through harsh criminal sanction, whilst at the same time at least symbolically vindicating the 
life of the baby (Brennan, forthcoming-a). 
This leads to our final reflection – if the law is unlikely to assist in the protection of 
newborn children and to assist vulnerable pregnant women from seeking help prior to going 
into labour, then what will? A number of scholars have concluded their studies into 
concealed/denied pregnancy and its connection with neonaticide by advocating that increased 
surveillance of all women of childbearing age is an appropriate preventative measure, 
including conducting regular pregnancy tests (Jenkins et al., 2011; Kaplan and Grotowski, 
1996). While such measures may capture a proportion of the women who fail to appreciate 
that they are pregnant until the later stages, such a proposal cannot hope to stop all cases of 
neonaticide. Furthermore, such testing would be obstructive and invasive for all women, 
prioritising the welfare of a child that is not yet conceived over the ability of women to 
control and regulate their own bodies (Brazier, 1999). Instead, the provision of support for 
vulnerable women would be a more appropriate and likely more successful programme for 
prevention. This could take the form of community support for women living with the threat 
of abusive relationships and those living in poverty. For young women, comprehensive, state 
regulated and mandated sexual health education which promotes the use of contraception, 
and support if a pregnancy occurs, would also be a reasonable measure for prevention. 
 
1 Analysis presented here is based upon the research conducted by Milne (2017b) 
2 Data as at 14 November 2016; figures are subject to revision as cases are dealt with by the 
police and the courts, or as further information becomes available. Data obtained from 
Homicide Index, Home Office. 
3 Data obtained from Office for National Statistics (2016). 
4 A duty of care, in other words liability for injury caused by negligence, is imposed in the 
case of road traffic accidents due to the existence of compulsory third party motor insurance, 
(Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976, ss 1(1) and 2; Cave, 2004, p. 55). 
5 Infanticide could be used as an alternative charge or conviction providing both the 
requirements for gross negligence manslaughter and the additional infanticide requirements 
had been proven, including the fact that the woman had a disturbance in the balance of the 
mind caused by the effect of childbirth (Infanticide Act 1938, s1(1) and 1(2)). 
6 Discussion of these defences is outside the scope of this chapter.  
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